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 Abstract: Rising wage inequality in the U.S. and Britain and rising continental European 
unemployment have led to a popular view in the economics profession that these two phenomena 
are related to negative relative demand shocks against the unskilled, combined with flexible 
wages in the Anglo-Saxon countries, but wage rigidities in continental Europe ('Krugman 
hypothesis').  
This paper tests this hypothesis based on seven large person-level data sets for the 1980s 
and the 1990s. I use a more sophisticated categorisation of low-skilled workers than previous 
studies, which highlights the distinction between German workers with and without 
apprenticeship training. I find evidence for the Krugman hypothesis when Germany is compared 
to the U.S. However, supply changes differ considerably between countries, with Britain 
experiencing enormous increases in skill supply explaining the relatively constant British skill 
premium in the 1990s. 
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1  Introduction 
The last quarter of the 20th century has seen a significant increase in wage inequality in the 
United States and Great Britain. However, this phenomenon has not been observed for Germany 
to a similar extent (cf. Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997; Steiner and Wagner, 1998; Fitzenberger, 
1999; Katz and Autor, 1999; Acemoglu, 20031). In Germany (and other continental European 
countries), a significant rise in unemployment has occurred in the 1980s and the 1990s, which 
contrasts with the fall in British and U.S. joblessness rates, especially during the 1990s. This 
difference in wage inequality and unemployment developments across the Atlantic led to a view 
which is sometimes called the ‘Krugman hypothesis’ (Krugman, 1994). It states that the rise in 
wage inequality in the Anglo-Saxon countries and the rise in unemployment in continental 
Europe are ‘two sides of the same coin’, namely a fall in the relative demand for unskilled 
workers.2 
This paper uses several (seven in total) person-level data sets to test whether the low 
skilled experienced a negative net demand shock in the U.S., Britain, and western Germany in the 
1980s and the 1990s and whether relative wage behaviour for the low skilled was rigid in western 
Germany but not in the Anglo-Saxon countries. If there is something to the Krugman hypothesis, 
then Germany – the country with increasing average unemployment – should have experienced a 
change in the unemployment/non-employment structure such that the relative unemployment 
likelihood of the unskilled has increased. The U.S. and Britain, however, should have seen a 
                                                          
1 The large increase in the 90/10 decile ratio reported in Table 1a in Acemoglu (2003) for the early 80s is most likely 
due to a change in the underlying original data set for Germany, which occurred in the Luxembourg Income 
Study between 1981 and 1984 (http://www.lisproject.org/techdoc/ge/geindex.htm).  
2 The main reason for this fall in relative demand for unskilled workers seems to be skill-biased technological 
change, rather than trade/globalisation (cf. Katz and Murphy, 1992; Berman, Bound, and Machin, 1998; Machin 
and Van Reenen, 1998; Pflüger, 2001; Acemoglu, 2002). See Card and DiNardo (2002) for an alternative view 
for the U.S. and Goux and Maurin (2000) for France. 
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stable (or converging) unemployment but a flexible wage structure.3 Unlike previous papers, my 
results will point to the crucial role of the German apprenticeship system in shielding a large 
section of German workers from the negative demand shocks experienced by low-skilled workers 
in the United States and Britain (prominent related studies are Nickell and Bell 1995; 1996; Blau 
and Kahn, 1996; Gottschalk and Joyce 1998; Krueger and Pischke, 1997; Card, Kramarz, and 
Lemieux, 1999; Kahn, 2000; Acemoglu, 2003).4 My results are also supportive of recent 
discussions in Britain to boost vocational education, which are in part influenced by the German 
apprenticeship system.5 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data sets used. Studies that 
analyse a wider spectrum of countries often must compromise on data quality (cf. Blau and Kahn, 
1996; Gottschalk and Joyce, 1998; Kahn, 2000; Acemoglu, 2003). The Luxembourg Income 
Study (LIS), for example, contains micro data on many countries, but often only monthly wages 
for household heads. Furthermore, one has at most 4 waves available for a two-decade period. 
Hence it is impossible to trace the developments in the 1980s and 1990s in a robust fashion with 
these data. Similar reservations apply to the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) data, 
where in addition the sample size per country is rather small (about 1,000-2,000 observations). 
Therefore, for each country investigated in this paper, I use at least one data set with 150,000 
                                                          
3 Figure 1 plots unemployment rates for the U.S., Britain, and Western Germany from 1980 to 2000. Although there 
are some issues concerning comparability mentioned in the note to the figure, one may argue that the increase in 
British and German unemployment in the 1980s was more like a ‘catch-up’ to standard U.S. levels. It was British, 
not German unemployment that became exceptionally high during this period. However, in the 1990s both British 
and U.S. unemployment fell markedly, whereas German unemployment ratched up again. From a macro 
perspective one might wonder whether this divergence is just a temporary cyclical phenomenon. However, it is 
the fact that the U.S. and Britain experienced significantly larger increases in wage inequality than Germany, 
especially in the 1980s when hourly wage inequality in Germany seems to have fallen as Figure 2 shows, which 
evoked wage rigidity explanations for rising continental European unemployment and made the Krugman 
hypothesis so widely accepted. 
4 Estimates of structural models of nominal and/or real wage rigidities in Germany are provided in Beissinger and 
Knoppik (2001), Bauer, Bonin and Sunde (2003), Fehr, Götte and Pfeiffer (2003), and Cornelißen and Hübler 
(2005), for example. 
5 Reform proposals of the Tomlinson report are available on http://www.dfes.gov.uk/14-19/. 
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workers or more in the labour force (with Britain in the 1980s as the only exception). I also check 
the sensitivity of my results using more than one data source for both Britain and western 
Germany in the 1990s. 
Differences in the changes of the relative skill (proxied by education) supply structures 
between countries are documented in Section 3. Section 4 presents a ‘microeconometric’ (using 
person-level data) test of the Krugman hypothesis in the form of statistical inference on changes 
in the wage and unemployment as well as non-employment structures. Consistent with the 
Krugman hypothesis, the results support the view that the rise in German unemployment was 
accompanied by insufficiently flexible wages in face of negative demand shocks against the 
unskilled. The affected groups are young workers and those with an education below 
apprenticeship training. Section 5 concludes. 
2  Data 
For the United States, I use the Current Population Survey Merged Outgoing Rotation Group 
(CPS-MORG) files. This is a representative and comfortably large data set frequently used in the 
related literature. For Britain and western Germany, I use three different data sets. For Britain, 
the  (large) British Labour Force Survey (BLFS) and the British Household Panel Study (BHPS) 
provide the desired information for the 1990s, but for the 1980s, I have to use the General 
Household Survey (GHS), for reasons explained below. For Germany in the 1990s, I use the 
German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), the (large) German Labour Force Survey 
(Mikrozensus, GLFS), and a (large) German administrative data set (IABR). Only the latter 
survey is available since the beginning of the 1980s, when German unemployment increased 
sharply.  
 4
The optimal data set for my purposes would (1) be representative for the whole population 
of a country, (2) contain a definition of labour force states in accordance with the International 
Labour Office (ILO) definition, (3) have accurate information on hourly wage rates, and (4) 
contain enough observations to guarantee precise statistical measurement. 
The U.S. CPS fulfills virtually all these criteria, although wages would be measured more 
accurately with administrative data. There has been a recoding of the education variable in 1992, 
which is treated as suggested by Jaeger (1997). Furthermore, I exclude all imputed earnings 
whenever they are flagged. However, I checked that the inclusion or exclusion of the flagged 
imputed wages made virtually no difference to my results (cf. Hirsch and Schumacher, 2002).  
The British Labour Force Survey (BLFS) is similar to the CPS, but there is no wage 
information before 1993 in the BLFS and until 1996. The BHPS has a much smaller sample size 
than the BLFS, but no clear advantages, except that it can be used as a robustness check. As the 
provided education variable in the BHPS is coded slightly differently than in the BLFS, I recoded 
the BHPS variable to make the two data sets better comparable. People on government schemes 
are identifiable in each wave and are counted as out of the labour force. For the 1980s, I use the 
General Household Survey (GHS), as the BLFS has no wage information during this period and 
the BHPS has not existed yet. The definition of O-level (exams at about the level of U.S. junior 
high school) and A-level (exams at about the level of U.S. high school) equivalents is different in 
the GHS from the BLFS, but these differences are not key to the results below. Due to the design 
of the GHS, I use only full-time workers to measure changes in the structure of wages, but all 
workers are used to estimate changes in un-/non-employment structures. 
For Germany, the data situation is also complicated (cf. Zimmermann and Wagner, 2002, 
p. 113). The GSOEP fulfills all criteria except (4), large sample size, and (3) in the sense that it 
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does not contain administrative wage data. The administrative IABR data is strong on criteria (3) 
and (4) except that this data is top-coded, excludes very low-wage workers, as well as civil 
servants. Also, hours of work are not reported, only a full-time/part-time indicator. Moreover, 
this data set does not meet requirements (1) and (2), as it is only sampling workers and people 
registered with the labour office who receive some form of unemployment benefit. One does not 
know whether these persons are really searching and are available for work in the short term, as 
required by the ILO definition of unemployment. Nevertheless, for what it measures, the IABR 
has the most accurate wage data available for Germany. As this data comes in spell form, I 
sample people on the 10th of April each year. The German Labour Force Survey (GLFS) meets 
criteria (1), (2), and (4), but fails on (3), as it only measures after-tax (hourly) income within 
intervals. This income can come from any sources, not just labour. Also, the top interval is open 
(implying top coding). Hence, as none of the German data sets comes close to being optimal for 
my purposes, it is worthwhile to consider all three data sets for Germany to check the robustness 
of the results for the 1990s. For the complete 1980s, only the IABR data are available.  
If feasible, I create a gross hourly wage variable (including overtime). This is possible in 
all countries and data sets except the IABR and the GLFS: in the IABR, I only use full-time 
workers as hours of work are not available; in the GLFS, I create a net hourly income variable for 
employed people as a proxy for the hourly wage. Wages of apprentices are excluded in all 
German data sets for the wage regressions below. In all countries and data sets, wages of self-
employed workers are excluded in the analysis of wage structures, but self-employed workers are 
counted as employed in the analysis of unemployment and non-employment. 
Similarly to the previous literature, I measure skill in the education dimension. Education 
is discretised into 4-5 groups depending on the data set and country. In order to acknowledge 
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diversity in the educational systems between countries, I preserve the national education 
categories instead of allocating American labels to non-American degrees. This would be 
especially difficult in Germany, which operates an apprenticeship system which has no direct 
equivalent in the U.S.6 
As some of the previous literature assumes the absence of relative supply shocks, Section 
3 provides a descriptive analysis of supply structures before the empirical methodology is 
developed in Section 4. 
3 Differences in Supply Changes Across Countries 
The graphs in Figure 3 demonstrate that, first, even within each decade, there were substantial 
supply side changes within the analysed economies (the results presented in the following are 
robust to the choice of the labour force instead of the working age population as the proxy for 
supply). Second, these figures show that the supply side changes differed between the three 
countries.7 It is shown in the graphs that, both in the 1980s and the 1990s, all countries have 
experienced skill upgrading in their working age populations (the same holds for the labour 
forces). Indeed, all data sets show an increase in the share of workers who have a degree as well 
as a decrease in the share of workers with the lowest level of education. However, it is very clear 
just from visual inspection of the graphs that these changes were most dramatic in Britain, caused 
by educational reforms (cf. Machin, 1996; 1998). The share of workers with no qualification in 
the working age population (as well as in the labour force) decreased by about 10 percentage 
points in Britain during the 1990s and by even more than 10 percentage points in the 1980s 
                                                          
6 Numbers of observations for each data set and sample unemployment and non-employment rates for different skill 
groups (using sampling weights as provided in the respective data sets) are available in the Internet Appendix.  
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(slight differences between the GHS and BLFS definitions of O-level equivalents account for 
small differences in the absolute shares of those below O-level equivalent). 
In the light of these results, the following section will apply a methodology to test the 
Krugman hypothesis without making any assumptions on the nature of supply (or demand) 
shocks. 
4 Differences in the Changes of the Wage, Unemployment, and 
Non-Employment Structures 
4.1 Identification of Relative Net Demand Shocks and Relative Wage Rigidities 
The methodology applied in this section identifies relative net demand shocks (i.e. ‘increasing’ 
and ‘decreasing’ labour markets) and wage rigidities from estimates based on person-level data. 
Conceptually, it draws on Nickell and Bell (1996) and Gottschalk and Joyce (1997) in that it uses 
unemployment/non-employment as a measure of quantity rationing (i.e. the failure of the market 
to clear) in the presence of wage rigidities. However, unlike these previous studies, I consider 
several classes of skill in the education dimension and control for these as well as other labour 
market characteristics (age, gender, region) in a regression framework in both the wage and 
unemployment models. As a sensitivity check, I also use non-employment (instead of 
unemployment) as a measure for quantity rationing. The modelling approach does not exclude 
that there is competition between heterogeneous types of labour. 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
7 There were also substantial differences in the changes of the age structures between the three countries. I will 
therefore – among other variables – control for age in the regressions below to account for changes in other 
dimensions of skill than education. 
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Theoretical Justification – Net Demand Shocks 
In order to make out increasing and decreasing labour markets, I develop a model that shows how 
‘net demand shocks’ can be identified from the observation of wage and unemployment/non-
employment changes. The framework rests on a neoclassical model of the labour market: 
( ),t t t tS S W Z=      (L×1 vector of labour supplies) 
( ),t t t tD D W Z=      (L×1 vector of labour demands) 
where tD  and tS  denote vectors of labour demand and supply for L different labour markets, 
respectively. tW  is a vector of wage rates and tZ  is a vector of demand and/or supply ‘shift 
factors’, like the size of the labour force, technological change or domestic and foreign demand. 
Unemployment or non-employment can arise due to a real wage rigidity that causes 
quantity rationing (i.e. the failure of the market to clear). Unemployment due to rigid wages can 
be expressed as a function of the vector of wage rates and supply/demand shift factors as 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
,
1 ,
,
t t t t t
t t t t
t t t t
S D D W Z
U U W Z
S S W Z
−= = − =      (1) 
                         (L×1 vector of unemployment rates). 
In practice frictional unemployment may be higher for some groups than for others. In order to 
net out this effect, it is useful to observe changes in unemployment and wages between two 
points in time t (1980 or 1991 in this paper) and t+τ (from 1981 to 1990 or from 1992 up to 2001 
in this paper).8 Using a Taylor expansion one obtains 
                                                          
8 Data availability is the reason for a separate consideration of the 1980s and the 1990s. Data availability (for 
Germany) is also the reason why 1991 and not 1990 is chosen as the base year for the 1990s. Below, I will also 
discuss sensitivity checks with respect to the base year. 
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, , ,
l
t l l l t l l j t j l j t j
t W t W t Z t
j l jown wage effect
cross wage effects pure net supply shift effects
net supply shift effect
U U W U W U Zτ τ τ τ
ξ
+ + + +
≠
∆ ≈ ⋅∆ + ⋅∆ + ⋅∆∑ ∑	
 	
 	

	

    (2) 
where ,l lWU , 
,l j
WU , and 
,l j
ZU  are elements of the Jacobian derivative of U  referring to the own 
wage (the wage in the same labour market), the wages in other labour markets, and the 
demand/supply shift factors, respectively. 
Economic theory allows to impose a light restriction, which is helpful for identification in 
the econometric analysis: if labour supply and demand schedules are ‘upward’ and ‘downward 
sloping’, respectively, then ,l lWU  will be positive, because a ceteris paribus increase of the own-
wage will increase unemployment in the corresponding labour market. ,l lWU  will also be positive 
in other cases, one of them being ‘backward-bending’ labour supply behaviour in case the slope 
of the demand curve is less steep than the one of the supply curve and there is no excess demand 
for labour. It therefore seems innocuous to impose the restriction that ,l lWU  is positive.  
As to the sign of the cross-wage effects ,l jWU , economic theory has little to say. This is 
also true for the sign of the derivative of unemployment with respect to the supply/demand shift 
variables, ,l jZU , as these variables subsume a wide range of unspecified factors. Note that no 
assumption is made on the size of substitution or any other demand or supply elasticities. These 
weak assumptions come at the price of not being able to measure demand or supply shocks and 
wage rigidity quantitatively. However, as can be deduced from equation (2), observation of the 
signs of the changes in wage and unemployment rates between two points in time identify the 
sign of the change in the net supply shift effect (i.e. the net supply shock) 
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, ,l l j t j l j t j
W t Z t
j l j
net supply shift effect
U W U Zτ τξ + +
≠
= ⋅∆ + ⋅∆∑ ∑
	

 
in 7 out of 9 cases (distinguished by the sign of wage and unemployment changes, similarly as in 
Table 1). Note that a negative net demand shock is equivalent to a positive net supply shock, i.e. 
0lξ > . A negative net demand shock implies a ‘decreasing’ market, that is, at a given wage, 
demand is falling faster than supply. 
Relative Net Demand Shocks 
However, the question posed by the Krugman (1994) hypothesis is not whether low-skilled 
workers experienced a negative net demand shock, but whether they faced a relative negative net 
demand shock. A relative negative net demand shock for a labour market l means that the net 
demand shock experienced by this market is more negative than the one affecting the reference 
market r (the latter refers to an ‘average’ market and is defined to be the 1980 or 1991 sample 
mean of the labour force or of the working age population in this paper). Identification of relative 
net demand (or supply) shocks is based on observing relative wage and unemployment changes: 
t l t r
t tW W
τ τ+ + ∆ −∆   and t l t rt tU Uτ τ+ + ∆ −∆  . 
The identification of relative net demand shocks also requires an additional assumption, 
namely , ,l l r rW WU U≈  (i.e. the ceteris paribus responsiveness of unemployment to the own-wage has 
to be roughly equal in all markets including the reference market). Using a Taylor approximation 
as for the derivation of (2) one can write: 
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, , , ,
, ,
t l t r
t t
l l t l r r t r l j t j r j t j
W t W t W t W t
j l j r
l j t j r j t j
Z t Z t
j j
U U
U W U W U W U W
U Z U Z
τ τ
τ τ τ τ
τ τ
+ +
+ + + +
≠ ≠
+ +
 ∆ −∆ ≈ 
⋅∆ − ⋅∆ + ⋅∆ − ⋅∆ +
⋅∆ − ⋅∆
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
.  (3)
 
Imposing , ,l l r rW WU U≈  yields: 
, ,t l t r l l t l t r l r
t t W t tU U U W W
τ τ τ τ ξ+ + + +   ∆ −∆ ≈ ∆ −∆ +        (4) 
where  
, , , , ,l r l j t j r j t j l j t j r j t j
W t W t Z t Z t
j l j r j j
U W U W U Z U Zτ τ τ τξ + + + +
≠ ≠
= ⋅∆ − ⋅∆ + ⋅∆ − ⋅∆∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  
is the relative net supply shock.  
Hence, by observing relative wage and unemployment changes, t l t rt tW W
τ τ+ +∆ − ∆  and 
t l t r
t tU U
τ τ+ +∆ − ∆ , and noting that equation (4) holds, even without knowledge of ,l lWU , the sign of 
the relative net supply shock ,l rξ  (which is the negative of the relative net demand shock) can be 
identified. ,l rξ  is the basis for the classification into ‘increasing’ ( , 0l rξ < ) or ‘decreasing’ 
( , 0l rξ > ) markets of labour market characteristics in Table 1 as will be shown in the following 
subsection. 
Empirical Implementation 
In order to take the above concepts to individual (person-level) data, I define a labour market l by 
its characteristics lx  (e.g. education, age, gender, region; the subscript l will be dropped 
hereafter), and denote the reference labour market r by x  (the 1980 or 1991 sample mean of the 
labour force). W and U  are defined as expected values of the wage rate w  and the 
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unemployment indicator ( )1u unemployed= , respectively. ( )1 i  is the indicator function which 
takes on value 1 if the argument is true and 0 otherwise. Hence I define 
t l t r
t t t t t tW W E w w E w w
τ τ
τ τ
+ +
+ + ∆ −∆ ≡  −  −  −      x x  
t l t r
t t t t t tU U E u u E u u
τ τ
τ τ
+ +
+ + ∆ − ∆ ≡  −  −  −      x x . 
In order to identify labour market characteristics associated with relative earnings or 
unemployment changes, I parameterise the distributions of w  and u  in the following way: 
ln t tE w  = x xβ  
( )t tE u  = Φ x xγ  
where ( )Φ i  denotes the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. 
These regressions are estimated using person-level data. A transformed version of the (dummy 
variable) coefficients of these non-linear parametric regression models forms the basis for the 
classification of each labour market characteristic kx  (e.g. low level of education as a proxy 
measure for a low level of skill) to its contribution to relative wage and unemployment changes. 
This contribution is measured by the changes in the transformed (denoted by an asterisk) 
coefficients over time: ( )* *, ,t k t kτβ β+ −  and ( )* *, ,t k t kτγ γ+ − , respectively. The transformed 
coefficients (as well as their standard errors) are calculated as in Haisken-De New and Schmidt 
(1997): ( )*t t= −I Wβ β , ( )*t t= −I Wγ γ , where I is the identity matrix and W is a matrix 
containing weights, which in my case are the base period (1980 or 1991) sample means. This 
transformation sets the ‘base category’ for all dummy variables equal to the base period sample 
mean. It can be shown that due to the non-linearity of the log-linear wage regression and the 
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probit model, this transformation is necessary to interpret changes in the coefficients over time as 
contributions to rising relative wages or unemployment likelihoods. Hence, instead of classifying 
each conceivable labour market defined by all dummy variable groups, one can just classify each 
labour market characteristic kx  into one of the nine cells defined in Table 1, depending on 
whether it contributed to a rising, constant, or falling relative wage rate or unemployment 
likelihood. The joint observation of the associations of a labour market (‘skill’) characteristic 
with changes in wage and unemployment/non-employment changes identifies both whether the 
characteristic (e.g. low level of education) is experiencing a net relative demand shock and 
whether it is affected by a relative wage rigidity. This is the approach taken in the following 
subsection. 
4.2 Empirical Results on Relative Net Demand Shocks and Relative Wage 
Rigidities 
In order to focus the discussion on the test of the Krugman hypothesis, Table 2 to Table 3 present 
the classification results as defined in Table 1 for the low-skilled groups only. Table 2 reports 
results for the 1980s with 1980 as the base year, after which unemployment rose sharply (cf. 
Figure 1). Results for the 1990s are displayed in Table 3.9 Between 4 and 5 different categories in 
of educational levels are distinguished in the estimations (depending on the data set, as exhibited 
in Figure 3), rather than only allowing for 2 skill types as in the studies by Nickell and Bell 
(1996) or Gottschalk and Joyce (1997). This is important because the low-skilled group is not as 
homogeneous in Germany as it is in the Anglo-Saxon countries, as more than half of the German 
population has received vocational training (apprenticeship), whereas just 20 percent have 
                                                          
9 The choice of 1992 as the base year in the CPS is due to the definition change of the education categories between 
1991 and 1992. In the following, I will also discuss results for 1991 and 1993 as the base year when considering 
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obtained only ordinary school education. This latter share is much higher in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries, at around 50 percent in the U.S. and even higher in Britain in the 1990s (cf. Figure 3). 
The classification results are based on two-sided t-tests with the null hypothesis that there were 
no changes in the coefficients of the wage or the unemployment/non-employment equation for a 
certain low-skill characteristic, e.g. education below apprenticeship level, between the base year 
(1980 or 1991) and the reporting year mentioned at the top of each column. Sizes of 5 percent of 
these t-tests correspond to a level of 10 percent (which is the upper bound of the true size, the 
lower bound being 5 percent) of the Bonferroni joint test of the null hypothesis 
( ) ( )* * * *, , , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 0t k t k t k t kτ τβ β γ γ+ +− = − = . As I do not want the level of the joint test to exceed 10 percent, I 
only consider 5 percent critical values for the t-statistics. This testing procedure allows for 
correlations in the error terms of the wage and unemployment regressions without imposing 
functional forms on their joint distribution. 
Depending on the test results each skill characteristic is classified into one of the nine 
fields as exhibited in Table 1 (tables and figures of detailed estimation results are presented in the 
Internet Appendix; figures of estimated education coefficients in the wage and unemployment 
regressions are displayed in Figure 4 and Figure 5. Classification results for the control variables 
gender and region are not presented here, but are available on request.10 The type of classification 
is reported as a number which is explained in the note to the tables and also corresponds to the 
numbers in Table 1. If the Krugman (1994) hypothesis were to hold, one would expect that low-
skilled categories in western Germany be classified as (1): ‘strongly rigid’, (2): ‘weakly rigid in a 
decreasing market’, or, if wages were somewhat but not sufficiently flexible, as (3): ‘weakly 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
the age dimension of skill. The results are robust with respect to the choice of base year. The year 1993 is chosen 
as base in the BLFS because there is no information on wages before this year. 
10 The working paper version also contains classification results with respect to different age groups. 
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adjusting in a decreasing market’. In the U.S. and in Britain, one would only expect relative wage 
adjustments, but no changes in relative quantity rationing (at least not to the disadvantage of the 
unskilled). Hence, low-skilled characteristics for these countries should be classified as (4): 
‘strongly adjusting in a decreasing market’. Although there is evidence for the Krugman 
hypothesis in the data, it turns out that the results are not as ‘clean’. 
Testing the Krugman Hypothesis with Respect to the Education Dimension of Skill 
Table 2 and Table 3 present classification results for the education coefficients (as a proxy 
measure for skill) in the three countries for the 1980s and 1990s, respectively. I report only the 
two lowest education groups in each country, which are high school and high school dropouts in 
the U.S., O-level equivalent and below O-level equivalent in Britain, and apprenticeship and 
below apprenticeship in western Germany. For the lowest education groups in these countries, 
there is a clear contrast between the Anglo-Saxon economies on the one hand, and western 
Germany on the other: The large data sets in Germany predominantly display classifications (1): 
‘strongly rigid’ (GLFS data) and (3): ‘weakly adjusting in a decreasing market’ (IABR data): 
results here are similar for the 1980s and the 1990s.11 In the U.S., by contrast, only the ‘flexible’ 
classifications (4): ‘strongly adjusting in a decreasing market’ and (9): ‘converging’ are observed 
in the 1990s (classification (4) also dominates during the end of the 1980s). In Britain, the least 
skilled group seems not to have experienced a negative relative net demand shock in the 1990s as 
it did in the 1980s (in the 1980s there are much fewer ‘rigid’ classifications (3) for the British 
than the German low skilled). However, as discussed in Section 3, there was a massive decrease 
in the relative supply of the least educated group in Britain in the 1990s (cf. Figure 3), which 
                                                          
11 The point estimates of the small GSOEP data set also suggest rising relative unemployment for the least skilled 
and falling relative wages, but especially the former are mostly not significant as the classifications in Table 3 
show. 
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must have netted out a relative ‘gross’ demand shock against this group. Hence, although the 
differences between western Germany and the United States are striking and consistent with the 
Krugman hypothesis, the British evidence points to the potential importance of supply side 
effects, which clearly differed between countries as shown in Section 3.12  
Considering the second lowest skill groups, there is no consistent picture supporting the 
Krugman hypothesis: In the U.S., classifications (4): ‘strongly adjusting in a decreasing market’ 
and (9): ‘converging’ alternate for high school graduates in the 1990s and classification (4) 
predominates in the 1980s. The evidence from the large British BLFS data set, however, suggests 
insufficiently flexible relative wages in terms of classification (3): ‘weakly adjusting in a 
decreasing market’ for the 1990s (nothing much happened in the 1980s). In western Germany, 
the evidence for the 1990s is not robust, with the GLFS exhibiting relative wage rigidity in the 
form of classification (2): ‘weakly rigid in a decreasing market’ but the IABR and GSOEP data 
suggesting otherwise (where classifications (6): ‘strongly adjusting in an increasing market’ and 
(7): ‘weakly adjusting in an increasing market’ prevail). The 1980s evidence supports the view 
that workers with apprenticeship training were not affected by relative wage rigidities in western 
Germany: over the decade as a whole, they experienced a positive instead of a negative net 
demand shock (classification (7)). 
If I use non-employment as the measure for quantity rationing (cf. the lowest panel of 
Table 2 for the 1980s and the lower panel of Table 3 for the 1990s), the results for the 1990s are 
                                                          
12 In the 1980s, choosing 1981 or 1982 instead of 1980 as the base year leads to similar results: The contrast between 
the Anglo-Saxon economies and Germany becomes even stronger, as the rigid classification (3) vanishes almost 
completely in these robustness checks for the United States and Britain, but not for western Germany. The 
German results are also robust to choosing 1984 as base year (this check is warranted by the inclusion of fringe 
benefits in wage measurement in the IABR since 1984, cf. Steiner and Wagner, 1998). 
In the 1990s, the classification results for western Germany are robust to the choice of 1992 or 1993 as the base 
period in all three data sets and in both the models with unemployment and non-employment as the measure for 
quantity rationing (there are only minor deviations which do not alter the interpretation of the results). The same 
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very similar to those obtained for unemployment as the measure for quantity rationing, except that 
in the British BLFS the lowest instead of the second lowest skill group displays relative wage 
rigidity. For the 1980s, however, the Krugman hypothesis breaks down if non-employment is 
used as the measure for quantity rationing, because wages for the lowest skill groups are now 
indicated to be rigid in the sense of classification (3), ‘weakly adjusting’, in both Britain and the 
United States (for Germany, the only data set available for the complete 1980s is the IABR, 
which does not allow to measure non-employment as opposed to unemployment). 13 
The Importance of Apprenticeship Training in Germany and Supply Changes in Britain 
The differences in the results for the two lowest education categories substantiate the value of 
considering various dimensions of skill as well as more detailed national education 
characteristics. Unlike previous studies like Nickell and Bell (1996) and Gottschalk and Joyce 
(1998), I show that distinguishing between additional than just high- and low-skilled groups 
reveals more sophisticated results: Indeed, both in the 1980s and the 1990s, evidence for 
Krugman’s hypothesis can only be found for the least skilled education groups, but not for 
German workers with an apprenticeship certificate. The relative supply of apprenticeship 
certificate holders has not fallen at all in western Germany in the 1980s and not fallen by much 
during the 1990s (cf. Figure 3c). This evidence is consistent with a point made by Nickell and 
Bell (1996) and Freeman and Schettkat (2000), namely that a large part of the ‘low-skilled’ in 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
holds for the British BHPS data with 1992 or 1993 as the base, as well as the U.S. results if 1993 is chosen as the 
base period. 
13 As in the case of the lowest education groups, the classification results for the second-lowest education groups are 
robust to the choice of alternative base years. For the 1980s, there is no change to the main results if 1981 or 1982 
instead of 1980 is chosen as base year. The German results are also robust to choosing 1984 as base year (this 
check is warranted by the inclusion of fringe benefits in wage measurement in the IABR since 1984, cf. Steiner 
and Wagner, 1998).  For the 1990s, the classification results for the second-lowest education groups are robust to 
the choice of 1992 or 1993 as base period in all three German data sets; and in the British BLFS in both the 
models with unemployment and non-employment as the measure for quantity rationing. The U.S. results are also 
robust when 1993 is chosen as the base period (note that 1991 is not a useful choice due to the definition change 
of the education variable between 1991 and 1992; cf. Section 2). 
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Germany may have a higher level of human capital than their peers in the Anglo-Saxon countries 
due to the training they receive through the German apprenticeship system. Indeed, the evidence 
presented here raises doubts on whether workers who have gone through Germany’s 
apprenticeship system experienced the same relative negative demand shocks as American high 
school graduates. Previous studies have lumped several low-skilled groups together and therefore 
blurred this interesting finding: A German-style apprenticeship education seems to convey skills 
that are of a rather different quality than the American high school (which provides classroom, 
but no vocational training). Consequently, the major low-skilled groups in the U.S. and Germany 
do not seem to have experienced the same relative negative demand shocks. However, what 
supports the view that negative relative demand shocks against the unskilled have been 
experienced across the industrialised world is that German workers with an educational level 
below apprenticeship have been affected by such shocks both in the 1980s and in the 1990s. 
Although my classification results identify only relative net demand shocks for the least skilled in 
western Germany, the fact that the supply of this group in terms of the working age population 
(and of the labour force) fell (cf. Figure 3c) leads to the conclusion that the negative relative net 
demand shock has been generated by a negative relative ‘gross’ supply shock and an even more 
negative relative ‘gross’ demand shock. 
Apart from relying on the classification results based on statistical inference, a look at the 
point estimates presented graphically in Figure 4 and Figure 5 helps to illustrate the different 
experiences of the three countries. The U.S. educational wage structure displayed in Figure 4a 
and Figure 5a shows how educational wage inequality increased fairly smoothly throughout the 
two decades (there might be short pauses in this trend in the late-1980s and the mid-1990s). By 
contrast, both the educational unemployment (and non-employment) structures became more 
equal since the mid-1980s. The most striking support for Krugman’s hypothesis is revealed by a 
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comparison of the changes in western Germany’s unemployment structure with the one of the 
U.S. in the 1990s (cf. Figure 5a and Figure 5c). The German unemployment structure has become 
more unequal, whereas the one in the U.S. has become more equal. This is exactly what the 
Krugman hypothesis states. The least educated in western Germany have also faced an increase 
in their non-employment likelihood in this period, which is not the case for the least skilled in the 
U.S., who have experienced a decrease (results are available upon request). However, albeit 
insufficiently flexible, the west German wage structure has not been completely rigid according 
to the administrative IABR data set (cf. Figure 5c for the 1990s and Figure 4c for the 1980s). 
What about Britain? Figure 5b shows that, compared to the U.S. experience, the British 
educational wage structure was fairly stable during the 1990s, although the developments were 
similar in both countries in the 1980s (cf. Figure 4a/b). The educational unemployment structure 
did not become much more unequal in neither the 1980s nor the 1990s (cf. Figure 4b and 
Figure 5b), which contrasts with the German experience, especially when the least skilled are 
considered in the 1990s. What is interesting about comparing Britain and Germany in the 1980s 
is that despite large increases in the aggregate unemployment rate in both countries in the early 
1980s with a subsequent decrease in the late 1980s (cf. Figure 1), in Britain, these shocks were 
not accompanied by large swings in the structure of unemployment as they were in Germany. 
This is further support for the view that unemployment in Germany is more related to the failure 
of relative wages between skill groups to clear the markets, so that we observe changes in relative 
quantity rationing. This illustrates the rigidity of the relative wage structure in Germany. For 
Britain, the broad picture that a stable wage structure could be sustained in the 1990s, without 
relative unemployment increases for the least educated as in western Germany, can be explained 
by the substantial relative supply changes as discussed in Section 3. 
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Are There Alternative Explanations? 
Sample Selection 
Although the evidence presented here (especially when western Germany and the U.S. are 
compared) is broadly consistent with the Krugman hypothesis, especially in the 1990s, one may 
raise alternative explanations for these regression results. One argument could be based on the 
issue of sample selection in wage regressions (Heckman, 1979; Leung and Yu, 1996): In the face 
of relative demand shocks against the unskilled, one expects workers with the least unobserved 
skills to lose their jobs first. Hence, standard wage regressions as presented here might falsely 
conclude that the wage structure between observed skill categories has remained stable, whereas 
in fact the price of skills (taking into account observed and unobserved factors) has fallen. At the 
same time, one would measure an increase in the relative unemployment and non-employment of 
the least skilled workers, as they either leave the labour force or prefer to draw unemployment 
benefits instead of working for a lower wage. However, if this explanation is claimed to be the 
only factor underlying the present results, then one would expect an increase in the relative 
unemployment or relative non-employment for the low skilled not only in western Germany, but 
also in the U.S. Yet, this did not happen to low education groups in the U.S. in the 1990s (it did 
in the 1980s, cf. Table 2 and Table 3) Therefore, the ‘sample selection interpretation’ cannot be 
the main factor driving the empirical observations of this paper for the 1990s.  
Changes in Search Intensity 
Another alternative explanation could be that changes in the search intensities of low-skilled 
workers drive differences across countries in the changes in the relative unemployment and non-
employment likelihoods. If this were the case, the Krugman hypothesis would not be the correct 
interpretation of the results presented here. In the 1990s, major reforms of the unemployment 
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benefit and welfare systems in the Unites States and in Britain with their emphasis on mandatory 
job search assistance and the introduction of work requirements were, with the exception of the 
British New Deal of 1998, not explicitly targeted at less educated workers (cf. Monthly Labor 
Review, various issues; Blank and Haskins, 2001; and Weil, 2002; for the U.S.; Van Reenen, 
2001; for Britain). However, the U.S. profiling system for unemployment insurance introduced 
since 1993 and significant welfare reform triggered by the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 can be expected to have taken effect mostly on these 
socio-economic groups (Blank, 2002). The same holds in Britain for the introduction of the Job 
Seekers’ Allowance in 1996 and the New Deal of 1998. However, also in Germany, welfare 
eligibility was made more stringent and work incentives were increased through the Welfare 
Reform Act of 1996. Moreover, there were no significant changes in the unemployment benefit 
regime in Germany during the 1990s that could explain the increased relative unemployment of 
the low skilled.14  
In the early 1980s, changes in German regulations made unemployment benefit receipt 
more stringent, but still relative unemployment of the low-skilled increased. Since 1984, the 
system became more generous again, especially for older workers (Steffen, 2002). Therefore, the 
steady upward trend in relative unemployment for the least skilled in Germany is not consistent 
with the timing of changes in unemployment benefit regulations in the 1980s. Similarly, the 
timing of major changes in unemployment benefit policy in the United States and Britain in the 
1980s does not concur with the development of the relative unemployment structures in Figure 4. 
The relative unemployment likelihood of the least skilled in Britatin remained rather constant 
                                                          
14 The only potential exception are increases in the minimum age for certain prolonged entitlement periods for 
unemployment benefits in 1997. These affected workers above 42 years of age. However, these changes, which 
for any given age group only altered the entitlement period by 2 months (e.g. from 14 to 12 months for 42 year 
olds), were rather minor. A summary of social policy changes in Germany since the 1970s is provided in German 
in Steffen (2002). 
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overall and even increased despite the introduction of the Restart program in 1987 (cf. Dolton and 
O’Neill, 2002). Also in the United States, the development of the unemployment structure is 
rather smooth, despite the large drop in benefit take-up rates in the early 1980s (cf. Blank and 
Card, 1991; Vroman, 1998). Nevertheless the tightening of eligibility rules since the mid 1980s 
by many states may have contributed to the decline in relative unemployment of the least skilled 
(cf. Monthly Labor Review, various issues). 
Business Cycles 
A third critique of the interpretation of the results might argue that the three countries are 
observed at different stages of their business cycles and that changes in wage and unemployment 
structures are mere reflections of movements within different stages of the business cycle. This 
argument also does not stand up to scrutiny: Although there are some movements in the wage and 
unemployment/non-employment structures, visual inspection of these movements in Figure 4 and 
Figure 5 provides no support that the movement towards more equality in the unemployment 
structure of the United States is a mere cyclical phenomenon. Instead, it seems to be a trend-like 
movement from the early 1980s onwards; two decades being a much longer period than the 
average cycle (cf. Stock and Watson, 1999). Similarly, no cyclical movements can be detected for 
Britain. In Germany, the increase in relative unemployment of the least skilled has also been a 
trend-like process in the 1990s and to some extent even in the 1980s, although in the 1980s the 
sharp increase in unemployment inequality between educational groups had been concurrent with 
the decreasing growth rates in the early 80s. Similarly, unemployment inequality decreased 
during the boom in 1989/1990. Nevertheless, even in the 1980s, the relative unemployment 
incidence of the least skilled in Germany moved almost monotonically upward and never reached 
the low level of the early 1980s again. Hence, the continuing deterioration in the relative 
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unemployment position of the least skilled in Germany seems to be a systematic problem of the 
last two decades. A further argument against the business cycle interpretation of my results is 
provided by the fact that robustness checks on the classifications (statistical tests) as discussed in 
the footnotes above give credence to the view that the reported main results are not sensitive to 
varying the base period between the years 1980 and 1982 as well as 1991 and 1993.  
Efficiency Wages 
A fourth argument could be that efficiency wages rather than institutions (as claimed by the 
Krugman hypothesis) are responsible for wage rigidities. Efficiency wages seem to be a 
particularly unconvincing explanation for least-skilled unemployment. One reason is that the 
least skilled may be a cheap group to monitor as they mostly do routine tasks which may be 
easier to evaluate than more diversified tasks of qualified workers (cf. Milgrom and Roberts, 
1992, Chapter 12). As monitoring costs are a major ingredient to the efficiency wage hypothesis 
(Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984), this raises doubt about efficiency wages explaing the rise in relative 
unemployment for workers without apprenticeship in western Germany. More importantly, the 
efficiency wage hypothesis cannot explain why experiences should differ as they do between the 
investigated countries. 
In sum, the microeconometric investigation of changes in wage, unemployment, and non-
employment structures with respect to education has found some support for the Krugman 
hypothesis both in the 1980s and even more so in the 1990s. This is especially true when 
comparing western Germany with the United States. 
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5 Conclusions 
Although it seems a consensus view among economists that rising European unemployment and 
rising inequality in the Anglo-Saxon countries are ‘two sides of the same coin’, namely a secular 
fall in the relative demand for the low skilled (‘Krugman hypothesis’), there are only few 
empirical studies testing this hypothesis with individual data. This paper tests the Krugman 
hypothesis for the 1980s and the 1990s. It is first shown that relative supply of skill groups 
changed in a different fashion in Britain, Germany and the United States. Subsequently, a 
methodology is applied which is agnostic about the nature of demand and supply shocks in its 
testing procedure. The approach developed in this paper also allows a more sophisticated 
distinction between different types of low-skilled workers than the previous literature. This turns 
out to be important, especially when distinguishing between Germans with and without 
apprenticeship training. 
Comparing the U.S. with western Germany renders support for the view that wage 
rigidities influenced unemployment (and non-employment) developments in Germany: Tests on 
changes in the wage, unemployment, and non-employment structures with respect to education 
reveal that the lack of sufficient wage flexibility impinged on the least educated German workers 
in terms of higher relative unemployment risk. However, there is tentative evidence that persons 
with a German apprenticeship certificate were not affected by a negative relative (net) demand 
shock. This suggests that the German vocational education system provides many workers with 
skills shielding them from both relative wage and relative employment losses. By contrast, the 
relative wage position of American high-school graduates deteriorated.  
On the other hand, the evidence on Britain demonstrates the importance of relative supply 
effects that helped to keep the educational wage structure constant in the 1990s.  
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Table 1: Relative Wage and Unemployment/Non-Employment Behaviour and Labour 
Market Classification 
 Contributing to a 
relative unemployment 
decrease ( )* *, , 0t k t kτγ γ+ − <  
Contributing to a 
constant relative 
unemployment ( )* *, , 0t k t kτγ γ+ − =  
Contributing to a 
relative unemployment 
increase ( )* *, , 0t k t kτγ γ+ − >  
Contributing to a 
relative wage increase ( )* *, , 0t k t kτβ β+ − >  
(7): , 0l rξ <  
weakly adjusting in 
increasing market relative 
to the reference market 
(6): , 0l rξ <  
strongly adjusting in 
increasing market relative 
to the reference market 
(1): , ?l rξ =  
strongly rigid 
(wage push) relative to 
the reference market 
Contributing to a 
constant relative wage ( )* *, , 0t k t kτβ β+ − =  
(8): , 0l rξ <  
weakly rigid in increasing 
market relative to the 
reference market 
(5): , 0l rξ =  
stable in stable market 
relative to the reference 
market 
(2): , 0l rξ >  
weakly rigid in 
decreasing market 
relative to the reference 
market 
Contributing to a 
relative wage decrease ( )* *, , 0t k t kτβ β+ − <  
(9): , ?l rξ =  
converging 
(wage pull) relative to the 
reference market 
(4): , 0l rξ >  
strongly adjusting in 
decreasing market 
relative to the ref. market 
(3): , 0l rξ >  
weakly adjusting in 
decreasing market 
relative to the ref. market 
Note: The terminology ‘increasing market’ refers to a positive relative net demand shock (which is the same as a negative relative 
net supply shock , 0l rξ <  for labour market l with respect to the reference market r as defined in Section 4). Increasing markets 
relative to the reference market are identified in cases (6), (7), and (8). Analogously, a ‘decreasing market’ is equivalent to a 
negative net demand shock. Decreasing markets relative to the reference market are identified in cases (2), (3), and (4). In cases 
(1) and (9), the sign of the net demand shock cannot be identified, , ?l rξ = . In case (5), there is no such shock. See also the 
theoretical discussion in Section 4. 
Table 2: Low Level of Education Classification Summary for the 1980s (Codes 1, 2 and 3 
Indicate Rigidity) 
Variable 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
With Unemployment as the Measure for Quantity Rationing 
U.S. (CPS; Base 1980)           
High School - 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
High School Dropout 4 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 
Britain (GHS; Base 1980)           
O-level equivalent - - - - - 8 - - 8 6 
Below O-level equivalent 2 - 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 4 
Germany (IABR; Base 1980)           
Apprenticeship - - 4 4 4 4 7 7 7 7 
Below Apprenticeship 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
With Non-employment as the Measure for Quantity Rationing 
U.S. (CPS; Base 1980)           
High School - 2 2 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 
High School Dropout 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Britain (GHS; Base 1980)           
O-level equivalent 8 - - 8 - 8 8 8 7 7 
Below O-level equivalent 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Note: The classifications are based on regression results controlling for education, age, gender, region, as well as the month of 
interview in the CPS and the GHS.  The classification codes are as defined in Table 1) 
Sources: Current Population Survey – Merged Outgoing Rotation Group Files (CPS); General Household  Survey (GHS); 
German Administrative Data – Institut für Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung Regionalstichprobe (IABR); own calculations. 
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Table 3: Low Level of Education Classification Summary for the 1990s (Codes 1, 2 and 3 
Indicate Rigidity) 
Variable 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
With Unemployment as the Measure for Quantity Rationing 
U.S. (CPS; Base 1992)           
High School  - - - 4 4 4 9 4 9 
High School Dropout  - 4 4 4 4 4 9 9 9 
Britain (BLFS; Base 1993)           
O-level equivalent   - - - - 4 3 3  
Below O-level equivalent   - - - - - - -  
Britain (BHPS)           
O-level equivalent - - - - - - - - -  
Below O-level equivalent - - - - - - - - -  
Germany (GSOEP)           
Apprenticeship 2 2 2 6 6 - 6 6 6  
Below Apprenticeship - 4 - 4 4 - - - 4  
Germany (GLFS)           
Apprenticeship  3  2 2 2   3  
Below Apprenticeship  -  6 1 1   1  
Germany (IABR)           
Apprenticeship 6 6 6 6 7 7     
Below Apprenticeship 4 3 3 3 3 3     
With Non-employment as the Measure for Quantity Rationing 
U.S. (CPS; Base 1992)           
High School  - - - 4 4 4 4 4 4 
High School Dropout  - 4 4 4 4 9 9 9 9 
Britain (BLFS; Base 1993)           
O-level equivalent   - - - 5 9 4 4  
Below O-level equivalent   2 - 2 2 2 2 2  
Britain (BHPS)           
O-level equivalent - - - - - - - - -  
Below O-level equivalent - - - 8 - - - - -  
Germany (GSOEP)           
Apprenticeship - - - 6 6 - 6 6 6  
Below Apprenticeship - 4 - 4 4 - - - 4  
Germany (GLFS)           
Apprenticeship  3  3 3 3   3  
Below Apprenticeship  8  1 1 1   6  
Germany (IABR)           
No Data           
Note: The classifications are based on regression results controlling for education, age, gender, region, as well as the month of 
interview in the CPS and the BLFS. The classification codes are as follows (cf. Table 1): (1): strongly rigid (rising relative wage 
and rising relative non-employment); (2): weakly rigid in a decreasing market (constant relative wage and rising relative non-
employment); (3): weakly adjusting in a decreasing market (falling relative wage and rising relative non-employment); (4): 
strongly adjusting in a decreasing market (falling relative wage and constant relative non-employment); (- = 5): stable in a stable 
market (constant relative wage and constant relative non-employment); (6): strongly adjusting in an increasing market (rising 
relative wage and constant relative non-employment); (7): weakly adjusting in an increasing market (rising relative wage and 
falling relative non-employment); (8): weakly rigid in an increasing market (constant relative wage and falling relative non-
employment); (9): converging (falling relative wage and falling relative non-employment).  
Sources: Current Population Survey – Merged Outgoing Rotation Group Files (CPS); British Labour Force Survey (BLFS); 
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS); German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP); German Labour Force Survey – Mikrozensus 
(GLFS); German Adminsitrative Data – Institut für Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung Regionalstichprobe (IABR); own 
calculations. 
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Figure 1: Unemployment Rates 1980 - 2000 
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Note: The U.S. unemployment rate is base on the CPS, which uses a definition of unemployment equivalent to the ILO definition. 
For Western Germany, OECD figures only provide the registered unemployment rate for a longer time period. Comparing the 
registered with the OECD standardized unemployment rate for united Germany suggests about a 1.5 percent difference between 
the two, so that the standardised unemployment rate for western Germany would also be lower than depicted in the graph. For the 
UK, however, the standardised unemployment rate is about 1 percentage point higher than the registered one shown in the graph. 
It is, however, not available for such a long time period. 
Source: OECD. 
Figure 2: Wage Inequality (Decile Ratios) 1980 - 2000 
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
4.00
4.50
5.00
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Year
U.S. (CPS)
Britain (BLFS)
Britain (GHS)
Germany (IABR I)
Germany (IABR II)
Germany (GSOEP)
 
Note: The plots exhibit the 9th divided by the 1st decile of the hourly wage rate (for German IABR data: daily earnings of full-time 
workers). The increase in the inequality measure for Germany in the IABR data between 1983 and 1984 is largely driven by a 
change of measurement between those two years: Since 1984, fringe benefits are included in the earnings variable (cf. Steiner and 
Wagner, 1998).  
Source: Current Population Survey – Merged Outgoing Rotation Group Files (CPS); General Household Survey (GHS); British 
Labour Force Survey (BLFS); German Administrative Data – Institut für Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung Regionalstichprobe 
(IABR); German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP); own calculations. 
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 Figure 3a: U.S. Education Sample Means Working Age Population 1980s & 1990s - 
(CPS) 
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Figure 3b:  British Education Sample Means Working Age Population 1980s & 1990s - 
(GHS & BLFS) 
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Figure 3c: German Education Sample Means Working Age Population 1980s & 1990s - 
(IABR & GLFS) 
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Note: Between 1991 and 1992 the coding of the education variable changed in the CPS, which explains changes in the shares of 
especially high school graduates and high school dropouts between those years. I therefore use 1992 as the base year for the 
reported classifications.  
Sources: Current Population Survey – Merged Outgoing Rotation Group Files (CPS); General Household Survey (GHS); British 
Labour Force Survey (BLFS); German Administrative Data – Institut für Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung Regionalstichprobe 
(IABR); German Labour Force Survey – Mikrozensus (GLFS). 
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Figure 4a: U.S. Wage and Unemployment Regression: Education Coefficients 1980s - 
(CPS) 
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Figure 4b: British Wage and Unemployment Regression: Education Coefficients 1980s - 
(GHS) 
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Figure 4c: German Wage and Unemployment Regression: Education Coefficients 1980s 
- (IABR) 
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Note: The left and right panels exhibit the transformed wage and unemployment regression coefficients *
,t k
β  and *
,t k
γ , respectively. 
The jump in the relative wages of workers with a degree in the IABR data is explained by a statistical phenomenon: Since 1984, 
companies have to include fringe benefits when reporting wages for this data set (Steiner and Wagner, 1998). In the paper’s text 
and footnotes, I therefore report sensitivity checks with respect to the choice of the base period for the classifications. It turns out 
that the change in measurement does not affect the classification results for low-skilled workers in the sense that classification 
results are essentially the same no matter whether 1980, 1981, 1982 or 1984 is chosen as base year. 
Sources: Current Population Survey – Merged Outgoing Rotation Group Files (CPS); General Household Survey (GHS); German 
Administrative Data – Institut für Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung Regionalstichprobe (IABR). 
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Figure 5a: U.S. Wage and Unemployment Regression: Education Coefficients 1990s - 
(CPS) 
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Figure 5b: British Wage and Unemployment Regression: Education Coefficients 1990s - 
(BLFS) 
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Figure 5c: German Wage and Unemployment Regression: Education Coefficients 1990s 
- (Wages: IABR; Unemployment: GLFS) 
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Note: The left and right panels exhibit the transformed wage and unemployment regression coefficients *
,t k
β  and *
,t k
γ , respectively. 
Sources: Current Population Survey – Merged Outgoing Rotation Group Files (CPS); British Labour Force Survey (BLFS); 
German Labour Force Survey – Mikrozensus (GLFS); own calculations. 
 Appendix 
 
 
 
 
Transatlantic Differences in Labour Markets  
Changes in Wage and Non-Employment Structures  
 in the 1980s and the 1990s 
 
 
 
Patrick A. Puhani 
Darmstadt University of Technology; SIAW, University of St. Gallen;  
IZA, Bonn; WDI, Ann Arbor, MI 
 
 
 
 
 
This Appendix includes only tables for the 1990s in order to demonstrate the 
regression results underlying the classifications reported in the paper. 
The results for the 1980s are made available on request  
 
 
 
 1
 
Table A1: Numbers of Observations 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
U.S. (CPS)            
Wage Regression 166,640 164,571 161,685 147,040 134,019 105,589 107,365 106,798 103,098 101,048 105,440
Unempl. Regression 214,970 212,232 208,411 202,498 200,246 177,983 180,462 181,377 182,691 183,530 196,172
Non-Empl. 
Regression 
283,576 278,606 274,198 266,401 263,147 232,780 235,372 235,549 237,754 238,950 255,548
Britain (BLFS)            
Wage Regression   33,441 33,924 35,809 35,485 63,367 69,952 67,058 64,366  
Unempl. Regression   283,381 279,782 282,896 274,108 260,728 262,232 258,136 253,360  
Non-Empl. 
Regression 
  362,679 357,707 362,278 350,368 332,907 334,519 327,482 321,094  
Britain (BHPS)            
Wage Regression 4,355 4,085 3,922 3,971 3,975 4,132 4,254 4,230 4,140 3,974  
Unempl. Regression 6,184 5,714 5,458 5,455 5,296 5,506 5,520 5,408 5,309 5,076  
Non-Empl. 
Regression 
8,056 7,598 7,269 7,225 7,036 7,314 7,289 7,005 6,866 6,553  
Germany (GSOEP)            
Wage Regression 3,969 3,852 3,877 3,747 4,007 3,898 3,789 3,949 4,100 7,258  
Unempl. Regression 5,527 5,360 5,378 5,119 5,423 5,311 5,159 5,588 5,560 10,156  
Non-Empl. 
Regression 
7,567 7,462 7,393 7,215 7,633 7,335 7,126 7,723 7,559 14,013  
Germany (GLFS)            
Wage Regression 134,115  131,774  135,266 132,696 133,106   132,930  
Unempl. Regression 169,287  169,734  176,098 171,260 174,199   170,346  
Non-Empl. 
Regression 238,321  235,371  244,291 239,708 242,307   234,421 
 
Germany (IABR)            
Wage Regression 156,049 157,493 154,606 148,811 147,495 143,780 140,906     
Unempl. Regression 205,424 209,560 210,288 207,097 205,829 203,028 200,607     
Note: Changes between 1995 and 1996 in the CPS are explained by the changes in the imputation flags (cf. Hirsch and 
Schumacher, 2002). The large increase in the number of wage observations in the BLFS between 1996 and 1997 is explained by 
the fact that respondents were asked about their wage only in the 1st quarter of interview up to 1996, but also in the 5th quarter 
since 1997. Columns with no entry signify that no data are available (to me) for these years. 
Sources: Current Population Survey – Merged Outgoing Rotation Group Files (CPS); British Labour Force Survey (BLFS); 
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS); German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP); German Labour Force Survey – Mikrozensus 
(GLFS); German Adminsitrative Data – Institut für Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung Regionalstichprobe (IABR); own 
calculations. 
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Table A2: Unemployment Rates by Education 
Variable 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
U.S. (CPS)            
Whole sample 6.8 7.5 7.0 6.1 5.6 5.3 4.9 4.5 4.1 3.9 4.6 
College Degree 3.0 3.3 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.7 2.4 
Some College 5.8 6.3 6.1 5.0 4.4 4.2 3.9 3.4 3.4 3.0 3.8 
High School 6.9 8.2 7.7 6.6 6.0 5.9 5.4 5.0 4.5 4.4 5.1 
High School Dropout 14.1 15.6 14.8 13.6 13.2 12.6 12.0 10.9 9.9 9.6 10.9 
Britain (BLFS)            
Whole sample   10.4 9.6 8.7 8.1 7.0 6.3 6.0 5.5  
Degree   5.4 5.1 4.8 4.7 3.8 3.5 3.2 2.8  
Higher – No Degree   4.7 4.5 4.5 4.0 3.3 2.8 2.9 2.8  
High School (A-level)   9.1 8.2 7.5 6.5 5.5 4.8 4.6 4.2  
O-level equivalent   10.2 9.3 8.7 8.6 7.4 6.8 6.7 6.3  
Below O-level equivalent   14.7 13.9 12.4 11.9 10.7 9.8 9.4 8.7  
Britain (BHPS)            
Whole sample 8.7 9.4 9.0 8.5 6.4 6.5 5.3 4.6 4.2 4.6  
Degree 3.8 5.4 5.4 5.3 5.1 4.7 4.7 3.0 3.1 2.3  
Higher - No Degree 3.4 3.5 4.5 4.0 3.3 1.2 3.1 4.2 1.8 3.7  
High School (A-level) 6.4 6.9 6.0 7.1 4.1 4.8 4.1 3.4 3.0 3.4  
O-level equivalent 7.8 7.9 7.8 6.4 6.8 6.1 4.7 4.0 4.1 4.1  
Below O-level equivalent 13.5 15.0 14.9 13.9 10.0 11.0 8.4 8.2 7.9 9.5  
Germany (GSOEP)            
Whole sample 3.6 3.7 5.1 5.4 5.9 5.6 6.7 6.8 5.4 4.5  
Degree 3.3 2.1 2.7 4.2 4.6 5.9 3.0 5.5 2.5 3.4  
Higher - No Degree 4.5 1.5 1.3 2.7 2.7 4.5 7.3 3.3 2.1 3.8  
High School - Abitur 5.0 6.8 9.7 5.4 11.1 9.8 8.8 11.7 10.0 8.9  
Apprenticeship 2.6 3.5 4.9 5.3 5.1 4.2 6.2 6.0 4.3 3.1  
Below Apprenticeship 5.8 5.7 7.9 7.9 9.3 9.5 10.2 10.7 11.3 10.2  
Germany (GLFS)            
Whole sample 3.2  5.3  5.8 6.4 7.1   5.0  
Degree 2.2  3.3  3.8 3.7 3.9   2.6  
Meister 1.8  2.9  3.5 3.7 4.0   2.2  
High School 3.2  4.7  5.0 4.6 5.6   3.4  
Apprenticeship 2.8  4.9  5.4 6.2 7.1   4.9  
Below Apprenticeship 5.6  9.3  10.5 11.4 12.9   9.4  
Germany (IABR)            
Whole sample 4.7 5.3 7.2 8.6 8.5 9.4 9.7     
Degree 2.9 3.0 3.5 4.5 4.5 5.4 5.5     
High School and Apprenticeship 3.3 3.0 3.8 4.7 4.1 4.7 5.0     
High School (Abitur) 3.1 3.5 4.9 5.9 4.8 5.7 5.9     
Apprenticeship 4.0 4.5 6.3 7.5 7.5 8.2 8.5     
Below Apprenticeship 7.0 8.1 11.2 13.7 13.5 14.8 15.4     
Note: Sampling weights are used wherever applicable. 
Sources: Current Population Survey – Merged Outgoing Rotation Group Files (CPS); British Labour Force Survey (BLFS); 
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS); German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP); German Labour Force Survey – Mikrozensus 
(GLFS); German Adminsitrative Data – Institut für Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung Regionalstichprobe (IABR); own 
calculations. 
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Table A3: Non-Employment Rates by Education 
Variable 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
U.S. (CPS)            
Whole sample 29.4 29.6 29.3 28.5 28.1 27.7 27.1 26.6 26.5 26.5 27.3 
College Degree 14.7 14.9 14.8 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.2 14.4 14.9 15.1 15.9 
Some College 25.0 24.6 24.4 23.2 22.7 22.6 22.4 21.7 22.1 22.1 22.9 
High School 27.6 29.4 29.4 28.7 28.3 27.6 27.0 27.0 26.8 27.0 27.7 
High School Dropout 51.9 53.7 53.8 53.4 52.9 52.5 51.3 50.0 49.8 49.2 51.2 
Britain (BLFS)            
Whole sample   29.8 29.1 28.4 27.8 26.9 26.3 25.6 25.1  
Degree   14.7 13.8 13.6 13.5 12.8 12.9 12.5 11.8  
Higher - No Degree   17.0 16.5 16.7 16.3 15.1 15.0 14.5 14.4  
High School (A-level)   24.9 24.6 24.1 22.9 22.3 21.8 21.1 20.7  
O-level equivalent   29.1 28.0 27.5 26.8 25.9 24.9 24.8 24.7  
Below O-level equivalent   39.9 39.9 39.1 39.3 38.9 38.7 38.6 38.5  
Britain (BHPS)            
Whole sample 30.3 32.0 32.1 31.8 30.2 30.5 29.2 27.3 27.3 27.3  
Degree 13.3 15.7 15.3 17.1 14.6 17.2 15.7 14.3 15.2 14.6  
Higher - No Degree 22.6 26.3 25.9 26.0 25.6 24.3 24.7 24.8 24.6 26.9  
High School (A-level) 21.7 24.4 24.7 25.2 24.2 23.8 22.1 19.0 19.3 19.9  
O-level equivalent 27.2 28.3 30.0 29.1 29.8 30.2 28.4 27.2 27.1 27.9  
Below O-level equivalent 41.9 44.2 44.5 44.2 42.1 43.2 43.6 43.8 44.1 44.8  
Germany (GSOEP)            
Whole sample 30.6 31.7 31.8 34.2 33.9 32.3 32.5 33.0 31.0 30.7  
Degree 16.0 14.6 14.8 15.4 15.0 15.0 13.3 15.1 11.9 14.7  
Higher - No Degree 22.4 23.4 19.0 23.5 24.8 24.2 24.9 25.0 20.4 22.4  
High School - Abitur 49.5 48.5 49.5 45.6 43.8 43.2 39.3 45.6 43.7 45.2  
Apprenticeship 26.9 27.5 28.4 30.2 30.4 29.1 30.6 30.7 28.8 29.5  
Below Apprenticeship 43.0 46.5 46.2 51.2 50.4 48.6 46.7 47.2 46.7 45.8  
Germany (GLFS)            
Whole sample 31.2  31.7  32.1 33.1 33.2   31.0  
Degree 15.0  15.3  15.8 16.5 16.8   15.9  
Meister 16.0  16.1  16.9 18.7 19.3   17.3  
High School 50.2  50.0  46.0 44.3 42.8   37.2  
Apprenticeship 26.1  27.4  28.6 29.9 30.9   29.6  
No Prof Training 47.1  47.1  49.3 49.7 50.2   45.4  
Note: Sampling weights are used wherever applicable. 
Sources: Current Population Survey – Merged Outgoing Rotation Group Files (CPS); British Labour Force Survey (BLFS); 
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS); German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP); German Labour Force Survey – Mikrozensus 
(GLFS); German Adminsitrative Data – Institut für Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung Regionalstichprobe (IABR); own 
calculations. 
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Table A4: U.S. and British Wage Regressions (Changes in Transformed Education 
Coefficients with Respect to the Base Year – Corresponding t-values in 
Parentheses) 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
U.S. (CPS; Base 1992)          
College  0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.06 
  (1.4) (4.7) (6.1) (5.9) (6.8) (8.5) (11.4) (12.9) (14.1) 
Some College  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0.7) -(1.1) (0.0) (0.5) -(0.2) (0.4) -(0.6) -(0.3) (0.8) 
High School  0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 
  -(1.1) -(0.4) -(1.9) -(2.9) -(3.5) -(4.4) -(7.2) -(7.4) -(8.8) 
High School Dropout -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 
  -(1.2) -(4.0) -(4.9) -(4.3) -(3.9) -(5.4) -(3.8) -(6.0) -(7.0) 
Britain (BLFS; Base 1993)         
Degree   0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  
   (0.9) -(0.9) (2.2) (0.6) (1.4) (0.9) (1.4)  
Higher - No Degree  0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02  
   -(0.3) -(1.0) (0.1) -(0.9) -(1.7) -(1.5) -(2.2)  
High School (A-level)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02  
   (0.1) -(0.1) -(0.4) (3.0) (2.8) (2.5) (2.4)  
O-level equivalent   0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02  
   (0.0) (0.6) -(1.1) -(1.7) -(2.2) -(3.0) -(2.8)  
Below O-level equivalent  0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00  
   -(0.5) (0.7) -(0.2) -(1.2) -(0.8) (0.3) (0.3)  
Britain (BHPS; Base 1991)          
Degree 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03  
 (1.8) (2.6) (0.5) (0.5) (1.4) (1.2) (0.5) (1.2) (1.3)  
Higher -  
No Degree 
-0.05 0.00 -0.05 -0.04 -0.07 -0.06 -0.05 -0.09 -0.04  
 -(2.0) (0.1) -(1.5) -(1.2) -(2.3) -(1.8) -(1.7) -(2.5) -(1.1)  
High School  
(A-level) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03  
 (0.2) (0.2) -(0.1) -(1.3) -(1.0) -(2.0) -(2.0) -(1.8) -(2.0)  
O-level equivalent 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.01  
 (0.5) -(0.5) (1.3) (1.0) (1.7) (0.4) (0.7) (1.5) -(0.6)  
Below O-level 
equivalent 
-0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03  
 -(0.7) -(1.2) -(0.5) (0.6) -(0.2) (1.4) (1.5) (0.8) (1.9)  
           
Note: t-values are based on standard errors allowing for clustering wherever applicable. Estimates use sampling 
weights wherever applicable. 
Sources: Current Population Survey – Merged Outgoing Rotation Group Files (CPS); British Labour Force Survey 
(BLFS); British Household Panel Survey (BHPS); own calculations. 
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Table A5: German Wage Regressions (Changes in Transformed Education Coefficients 
with Respect to 1991 – Corresponding t-values in Parentheses) 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Germany (GSOEP)          
Degree 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.06 -0.05 -0.10 -0.12 -0.06 -0.07 
 -(0.1) (0.2) -(0.7) -(1.6) -(1.6) -(3.4) -(3.3) -(1.4) -(1.5) 
Higher - No Degree -0.01 0.04 -0.02 0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.06 
 -(0.4) (1.2) -(0.4) (0.7) -(0.9) -(0.6) -(0.8) -(0.6) (1.6) 
High School - Abitur 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.14 0.03 0.06 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 
 (0.6) (1.3) (1.6) (2.5) (0.4) (0.8) (0.0) -(0.2) -(0.2) 
Apprenticeship 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.04 
 -(0.7) (1.0) (0.0) (2.1) (3.6) (1.6) (2.9) (2.8) (3.5) 
Below Apprenticeship 0.01 -0.05 0.00 -0.05 -0.05 0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.08 
 (0.8) -(2.4) (0.2) -(2.0) -(2.4) (0.8) -(0.3) -(1.4) -(2.8) 
Germany (GLFS)          
Higher  0.00  -0.03 -0.05 -0.06   -0.06 
  -(0.3)  -(6.1) -(11.2) -(14.5)   -(13.6) 
Meister  0.00  -0.01 -0.03 -0.03   -0.01 
  -(0.7)  -(2.3) -(4.8) -(5.9)   -(1.4) 
High School  0.03  0.04 0.06 0.06   0.05 
  (5.4)  (6.7) (9.0) (9.4)   (8.4) 
Apprenticeship  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00   0.00 
  -(3.2)  -(1.9) -(1.1) -(1.0)   -(3.4) 
Below Apprenticeship  0.01  0.02 0.03 0.04   0.04 
  (1.4)  (4.4) (7.5) (9.9)   (10.1) 
Germany (IABR)          
Degree 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01    
 (3.8) (3.7) (3.5) (5.6) (2.6) (1.5)    
High School and 
Apprenticeship 
0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03    
 (3.1) (4.2) (3.7) (3.1) (4.2) (4.3)    
High School (Abitur) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.07 -0.01    
 (1.4) (1.1) (0.9) (2.3) (3.4) -(0.4)    
Apprenticeship 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01    
 (3.0) (4.9) (6.6) (7.3) (8.6) (10.7)    
Below Apprenticeship -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03    
 -(6.8) -(8.8) -(10.4) -(12.4) -(13.1) -(13.2)    
Note: t-values are based on standard errors allowing for clustering wherever applicable. Estimates use sampling 
weights wherever applicable. 
Sources: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP); German Labour Force Survey – Mikrozensus (GLFS); German 
Adminsitrative Data – Institut für Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung Regionalstichprobe (IABR); own calculations. 
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Table A6: U.S. and British Unemployment Regressions (Changes in Transformed 
Education Coefficients with Respect to the Base Year – Corresponding t-
values in Parentheses) 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
U.S. (CPS; Base 1992)           
College Degree  0.01 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.10 
  (0.9) (2.6) (3.2) (2.0) (1.7) (4.1) (5.1) (3.5) (6.2) 
Some College  0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 
  (1.1) -(1.2) -(2.4) -(2.0) -(1.3) -(2.9) -(1.0) -(2.2) -(1.8) 
High School  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 
  -(1.1) -(1.2) -(1.2) (0.0) -(0.7) -(0.6) -(2.4) -(0.3) -(2.8) 
High School Dropout  -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 
  -(1.4) -(0.6) (0.2) -(0.2) (0.1) -(1.5) -(3.0) -(2.1) -(3.0) 
Britain (BLFS; Base 1993)          
Degree   0.01 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.02  
   (0.5) (1.0) (2.2) (1.6) (2.7) (1.5) (1.1)  
Higher - No Degree   0.01 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.06  
   (0.4) (1.7) (1.3) (0.7) (0.0) (1.1) (1.9)  
High School (A-level)   -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.05 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07  
   -(1.2) -(1.0) -(3.5) -(3.8) -(4.7) -(4.7) -(4.7)  
O-level equivalent   -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03  
   -(0.6) (0.4) (1.6) (1.1) (1.2) (2.1) (2.1)  
Below O-level 
equivalent 
  0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  
   (0.9) -(1.4) -(0.6) (0.9) (1.3) (0.8) (0.5)  
Britain (BHPS; Base 1991)          
Degree 0.11 0.06 0.14 0.29 0.24 0.33 0.16 0.19 -0.01  
 (1.0) (0.5) (1.1) (2.4) (2.0) (2.7) (1.2) (1.4) -(0.1)  
Higher - No Degree -0.07 0.11 0.07 0.11 -0.33 0.13 0.37 -0.03 0.21  
 -(0.4) (0.7) (0.4) (0.6) -(1.7) (0.7) (2.0) -(0.1) (1.2)  
High School (A-level) -0.05 -0.10 0.03 -0.09 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02  
 -(0.8) -(1.6) (0.5) -(1.3) (0.0) -(0.1) -(0.6) -(0.6) -(0.3)  
O-level equivalent -0.04 -0.02 -0.10 0.05 0.03 -0.05 -0.07 -0.01 -0.08  
 -(0.7) -(0.4) -(1.6) (0.8) (0.4) -(0.8) -(0.9) -(0.1) -(1.0)  
Below O-level 
equivalent 
0.04 0.05 0.00 -0.07 -0.02 -0.07 -0.04 -0.01 0.03  
 (1.1) (1.1) -(0.1) -(1.4) -(0.4) -(1.4) -(0.6) -(0.2) (0.5)  
           
Note: t-values are based on standard errors allowing for clustering wherever applicable. Estimates use sampling 
weights wherever applicable. 
Sources: Current Population Survey – Merged Outgoing Rotation Group Files (CPS); British Labour Force Survey 
(BLFS); British Household Panel Survey (BHPS); own calculations. 
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Table A7: German Unemployment Regressions (Changes in Transformed Education 
Coefficients with Respect to 1991 – Corresponding t-values in Parentheses) 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Germany (GSOEP)          
Degree -0.24 -0.24 -0.07 -0.08 0.10 -0.34 -0.08 -0.29 -0.09 
 -(1.2) -(1.4) -(0.4) -(0.5) (0.6) -(2.0) -(0.5) -(1.6) -(0.6) 
Higher - No Degree -0.52 -0.70 -0.39 -0.47 -0.19 -0.04 -0.46 -0.52 -0.16 
 -(2.3) -(3.4) -(1.9) -(2.3) -(0.8) -(0.2) -(2.2) -(2.5) -(0.9) 
High School - Abitur 0.17 0.11 -0.22 0.18 0.08 -0.05 0.08 0.10 0.09 
 (0.9) (0.5) -(0.8) (0.7) (0.3) -(0.2) (0.3) (0.4) (0.4) 
Apprenticeship 0.11 0.14 0.12 0.07 0.02 0.10 0.07 0.07 -0.01 
 (2.4) (3.1) (2.7) (1.6) (0.4) (2.0) (1.4) (1.5) -(0.1) 
Below Apprenticeship -0.03 -0.04 -0.14 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 -0.02 0.10 0.09 
 -(0.3) -(0.5) -(1.5) -(0.3) -(0.5) -(0.6) -(0.2) (1.0) (1.1) 
Germany (GLFS)          
Higher  -0.06  -0.07 -0.12 -0.16   -0.15 
  -(2.6)  -(2.7) -(5.2) -(6.8)   -(5.9) 
Meister  -0.06  -0.02 -0.06 -0.09   -0.15 
  -(1.8)  -(0.8) -(2.1) -(2.8)   -(4.6) 
High School  -0.07  -0.08 -0.16 -0.13   -0.16 
  -(2.2)  -(2.4) -(5.0) -(4.2)   -(5.2) 
Apprenticeship  0.03  0.02 0.04 0.05   0.05 
  (3.4)  (2.2) (5.6) (6.7)   (6.8) 
Below Apprenticeship  0.02  0.03 0.04 0.04   0.06 
  (1.0)  (1.9) (2.5) (2.8)   (4.0) 
Germany (IABR)          
Degree -0.04 -0.13 -0.12 -0.11 -0.08 -0.11    
 -(1.4) -(4.9) -(4.6) -(4.1) -(3.1) -(4.1)    
High School and 
Apprenticeship 
-0.09 -0.13 -0.13 -0.18 -0.17 -0.18    
 -(2.2) -(3.1) -(3.2) -(4.2) -(4.1) -(4.3)    
High School (Abitur) -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.09 -0.07 -0.08    
 -(0.2) (0.0) -(0.3) -(1.5) -(1.1) -(1.4)    
Apprenticeship 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01    
 (0.5) (0.7) -(1.7) -(1.3) -(2.4) -(2.5)    
Below Apprenticeship 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08    
 (1.4) (3.9) (6.4) (6.5) (6.8) (7.8)    
Note: t-values are based on standard errors allowing for clustering wherever applicable. Estimates use sampling 
weights wherever applicable. 
Sources: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP); German Labour Force Survey – Mikrozensus (GLFS); German 
Adminsitrative Data – Institut für Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung Regionalstichprobe (IABR); own calculations. 
 
 
